You’ve written about “the American grand strategy.” What do you consider that to mean?
It describes the use of all of the nation’s resources and power for the end goals it wants to achieve in the world. It’s not just about using the military. It’s not just about the economy. Rather it’s drawing on all those elements and resources a country has — its ideas, its values, the military, its economy, its diplomatic expertise, its intelligence community — drawing all those together and then saying, what are the big threats and big opportunities we face in the world and how do we align all of those resources and choose our priorities? Because you can’t do everything. You can’t stop all the threats. You can’t seize all the opportunities. How do we identify the most severe threats and the most attractive opportunities and how do we act on them?
In the case of President Reagan, he had a grand strategy of winning the Cold War peacefully. It involved identifying the weaknesses in the Soviet system: its oppression of its people and decrepit economy, the blowback it was experiencing for being an aggressive imperial power in Central and Eastern Europe and elsewhere around the world, and also the vulnerabilities in its military. He then looked for ways to bring pressure on that Soviet system, with a military buildup, with an economic expansion, with deepening partnerships with our allies. America’s allies are a vitally important source of our national strength and our grand strategy. Reagan wanted to bring pressure on the Soviets but pressure in which they would feel like they needed to negotiate. He always sought to negotiate with the Soviets. He wanted to put pressure that would produce a more reform-minded leader with whom he could negotiate. Then Gorbachev comes along, and Reagan says, “There’s my guy.” That combination of pressure and diplomacy working together, that’s how he had a grand strategy to expand freedom in the world and bring the Cold War to a peaceful end through the dissolving of the Soviet Union.
You’ve said Reagan embodied a philosophy of “conservative internationalism.” How do each of those words distinguish it from other foreign policy strategies, and are you a fan?
Yes, I would identify myself as a conservative internationalist. I’ll start with the “internationalist” part. That advocates American engagement with the world. It’s very opposed to isolationism. The United States needs to be active in the world, lead the world, be involved in international institutions with allies.
The “conservative” part emphasizes America’s distinctive values. This embraces some notion of American exceptionalism and also emphasizes the roles that military and economic strength play. I don’t think it’s a belligerent philosophy, looking to start unnecessary wars, but it understands that the presence and use of a strong military can strengthen diplomacy. That’s often best done through America’s cooperation with its allies and less so through formal international institutions, which too often can be bureaucratically gummed up or hijacked by malevolent powers such as Russia and China. It’s a big-tent philosophy, and conservative internationalists will differ among themselves about what to do about specific issues, such as the Iranian nuclear program.
Was JFK a conservative internationalist by that definition?
He certainly had elements of conservative internationalism, yes. JFK is an endlessly fascinating figure. It’s hard to evaluate Kennedy’s foreign policy because he had less than three years in office, and there are endless debates about what a full Kennedy presidency of one or even two terms would have looked like. He had his share of missteps, like the Bay of Pigs. And he certainly wasn’t using conservative internationalism in 1961 when he sent signs of weakness to Khrushchev and didn’t respond assertively enough when Khrushchev put up the Berlin Wall.
But his management of the Cuban Missile Crisis, combining the threat of force and naval blockade with some creative diplomacy to avoid a war, was a masterpiece of it. And he certainly had a very lofty vision for America’s unique role in the world as an exemplar of freedom and supporter of those who aspired to freedom. Those would also be part of his conservative internationalism. Recently, there have been more conservative internationalists among Republicans, whether a Marco Rubio or a Mitt Romney. But it’s by no means exclusive to the Republican Party. Harry Truman would also be a conservative internationalist by this definition.
So in this case, conservatism does not signify preference for small government; it signifies willingness to use the military.
Right. It starts with a philosophy that if one of the main constitutional responsibilities of a government is to provide for the defense of the country, then conservatives want to put enough resources into the military to ensure that. So it’s one of the few areas where conservatives will be more supportive of government spending, even if they are not as supportive of expansive government spending on all domestic programs.
There seems to be a popular notion that Reagan underwent a change of heart in office, moving from “evil empire” rhetoric to arms reduction treaties. Did he?
No. In my forthcoming book, I argue very much against the belief that there was a Reagan reversal, that he underwent a change of heart. From the day he took office, it’s very clear he wanted to pursue this two-pronged strategy of confronting the Soviet Union and also reaching out. In March 1981, just two months into office when Reagan is in a hospital bed recovering from the assassination attempt, he writes a letter to Brezhnev saying in effect, “We really need to talk. I really want to have a meeting with you. Let’s do some negotiations.” The problem was, he also knew that for it to be effective, he had to have a willing negotiating partner, and that doesn’t come along until Gorbachev.
Throughout his life, Reagan was a nuclear abolitionist. He was terrified of nuclear weapons, but he first wanted to get rid of Soviet communism. He knew that in a fallen world — if I can use a theological term, where there are aggressive, malevolent forces who also have these destructive weapons, sometimes you first need to build up your nuclear arsenal in order to confront the evil adversary, and only then can you build down your nuclear weapons.
Where I do see a change or evolution in Reagan is this: When he first came into office, he was interested in supporting democracy and human rights in communist countries, but was less interested in doing so with right-wing authoritarian countries who were America’s anticommunist allies. But by his second year in office, particularly with his June 1982 Westminster address in London, he became much more interested in supporting democracy and human rights globally. Then by his second term, he engaged in pretty assertive diplomacy with American allies like South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Chile and others to democratize. Authoritarian governments supported by the U.S. were getting pressure from the Reagan administration to transition to democracy. He tied this back to the Cold War. He realized it’s not enough to just criticize communism; you need to show a positive alternative. You need to show what a free society looks like, the human flourishing that’s possible in societies that have political, religious and economic liberty. He also realized the need for moral consistency, that standing for freedom should not be hobbled with exceptions.
When we think of national security, we overwhelmingly think of four countries: China, North Korea, Russia, and Iran. Are there others out there we should be keeping one eye on?
Between coronavirus and those four countries you mentioned, we certainly have enough on our plate. I don’t want to sound too alarmist. That said, jihadist terrorism is still a threat. We’ve enjoyed some tremendous counterterrorism successes under presidents Bush, Obama and Trump, with the killing of Bin Laden and Al-Baghdadi, the ISIS leader. We’re now 19 years after 9/11 and have not had another mass-casualty terrorist attack in the United States. However, ISIS has reconstituted itself in parts of Iraq and Syria. Al Qaeda is still alive and active in parts of South Asia, with franchises on the Arabian Peninsula and in Africa. I don’t want us to lose sight of the terrorist threat. We’ve managed it pretty well, but all it takes is one set of bad guys getting through, and great harm could be done.
I also worry about some fragile states. Pakistan comes to the top of mind. They have a large number of nuclear warheads and a fragile government living in a difficult neighborhood. And some pretty compromised members of its intelligence community have been supporting the bad guys.
You mentioned the need for moral consistency a moment ago. Do we risk moral inconsistency in our relationship with Iran on the one hand and Saudi Arabia on the other?
Speaking as a recovering policymaker, hard choices, compromises and even some hypocrisies are always going to be a part of the landscape. Those are the messy trade-offs of policymaking. I now have the luxury of being a professor and opining without the responsibility of policymaking, so I want to be very careful not to sound too sanctimonious.
I appreciate historically that the American-Saudi partnership was very important during the Cold War. I also appreciate that in the contemporary moment they are a counterweight to Iran because I’m pretty hawkish on Iran. Whether it’s in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon or any number of other places, Iran is still pursuing an aggressive, violent, destabilizing approach. The regime supports terrorism that has killed a number of Americans going back to 1983. Insofar as the United States should oppose Iran’s bad behavior, the Saudis are partners in that respect.
With all of that said, back in my time in government, I worked occasionally on U.S.-Saudi relations. I traveled to Saudi Arabia multiple times and have seen the oppression of their people, of women, of religious minorities, even of Shia Muslims, which is appalling. Then there is the regime’s support for a pretty extremist version of Islam; it’s no accident that 15 of the 19 9/11 hijackers were Saudis.
For the last few years I have thought that perhaps it’s time for the U.S. to recalibrate its relationship with Saudi Arabia. I do not want us being as supportive of the Saudis as we have been. Many years ago on a trip to Riyadh, I had dinner with a journalist named Jamal Khashoggi, who was gruesomely murdered last year reportedly at the behest of Mohammed bin Salman, so there’s a personal element for me to this. MBS’s orchestration of the war in Yemen has been appalling. His blockade of Qatar has been reckless and destabilizing. He’s certainly been very despotic in his treatment of a lot of his own people.
Thanks to the shale revolution and America’s much more diversified energy sources, the world is not as dependent on Saudi petroleum as it once was. It’s time for the U.S. to rethink and potentially distance itself more from Saudi Arabia.
More on William Inboden: Reared in Tucson and educated at Stanford and Yale, in 1995, he began working in Washington, D.C., first as a staff member for Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Georgia), then for Rep. Tom DeLay (R-Texas). In 2002, he became a special adviser in the State Department for international religious freedom and later joined its policy planning staff. In 2005, he began two years of service on the National Security Council as senior director for strategic planning. Inboden’s think-tank experience includes the American Enterprise Institute and leading the London-based Legatum Institute. His classes, Ethics & International Relations and Presidential Decision-Making in National Security, have been selected in recent years as the “Best Class in the LBJ School.”
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